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PANEL 6: THE MEDIAN JUSTICE 
MODERATOR: ERIC SEGALL  
PANELISTS: JONATHAN ADLER, LEE EPSTEIN, AND SASHA 
VOLOKH 
 
Professor Eric Segall: This panel maybe should have been the first 
panel, I don’t know, it was a close call. It was going to be first or last, 
and I chose last, and it may have been a mistake. This is the panel 
where we’re going to talk about the idea that we’ve been talking 
about all afternoon, of Justice Kennedy being “the median Justice” 
and being the, obviously, most important Justice of the last seventeen 
years and maybe the last thirty years. Lee Epstein is just a hall of 
famer when it comes to Supreme Court data and databases and these 
kinds of issues. 
So, I’m going to start by just asking Lee to describe what we mean 
by the Median Justice, how powerful a median justice Justice 
Kennedy was, and how valuable is this idea at all? 
Professor Lee Epstein: Sure. 
Professor Segall: I’m sorry, I did not do the schools, I apologize. 
Sasha Volokh is from Emory, and Jonathan Adler, who you’ve met 
before, is from Case Western, and Lee’s teaching at Washington 
University. I’m sorry. 
Professor Epstein: The median Justice is the Justice in the middle of 
a distribution. The distribution could be anything, could be the 
number of children they have or their ages or—but usually, when we 
talk about the median Justice on the Supreme Court, we’re referring 
to ideology. So, the median Justice—the middle Justice—half the 
Justices are to that Justice’s left, more liberal and half to the right, 
more conservative. I think that’s what we typically mean. We could 
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talk about a distribution on originalism or other methods, but that’s 
not typically the case. 
Professor Segall: And how dominant was he as a median Justice? 
Professor Epstein: We did some calculations on this. We went back 
to 1937 to present, 2017 term. That’s eighty-one terms. It turns out 
during that eighty-one-term period, there were nineteen median 
Justices, but I would say Justice Kennedy dominated. He was, of the 
eighty-one terms, he was median Justice eighteen times. Byron 
White: fifteen times; Sandra Day O’Connor: nine; Reed: six; Clark: 
six. When we created that list, one question—am I allowed to ask 
questions, or you are the only one? 
Professor Segall: Please. I’d rather retire, so please. 
Professor Epstein: Here’s a question about that: these are the kind 
of the super medians, the people who held positions of power for a 
very long time. It’s not a very distinguished list in the sense of—I 
don’t really think of Reed, Clark, even Byron White, I don’t think 
they have much legacies that they’ve left on the Court. Mike Dorf 
made an interesting point earlier that when he thinks about legacy, he 
thinks about it in a historical way. When we think about the period 
from 2005 to 2017, we think about a period of domination by Justice 
Kennedy. So, that’s one way to think about it. 
But another is, Eric, more what you were talking about, is today, 
what do we think? Have their opinions had enormous effect and 
they’re still around and so on. Maybe being a super median, like a 
Justice Kennedy, is not a good thing for your legacy. 
Professor Segall: You guys want to respond to that? 
Professor Jonathan Adler: Well, go ahead. 
Professor Sasha Volokh: I think there are many ways that you can 
be a median. For example, if you’re a median because you have 
wishy-washy views—where you have no philosophy and you split 
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the difference between everybody—then you’re the median and you 
determine a lot of decisions. But then, since you had nothing original 
and distinctive, no one thinks of you as someone distinctive. On the 
other hand, you could be a median Justice because you really do have 
something—a distinctive view—which just, by coincidence, happens 
to be in the middle on some particular issues. 
So, I think there’s no reason to inherently expect that the set of 
median Justices is particularly distinguished. Maybe we can compare 
this with parliamentary politics, where there’s going to be some 
median, small political party that can throw its weight around. Are 
those median, small political parties the most brilliant politicians, the 
most statesmen-like, or are they just the ones that happen to be 
necessary for a coalition? And so, I think there’s probably not much 
that we can say as a matter of principle about whether this should be 
a distinguished group. 
What I found interesting is, you brought this back to the discussion 
earlier in the day about whose legacy is more enduring. And I think 
one thing I didn’t really like about the earlier discussion was that 
there was an effort to connect who was more significant with how 
long it takes for their decisions to be overruled. If you take the 
simplest-possible political science model where any new majority 
can just change the decisions of an earlier majority, it’s always the 
median Justice who dominates. 
Then, if you have a Justice Kennedy, and if, as soon as he leaves, 
his decisions keep being around, all that means is that the new 
median agrees with Justice Kennedy on those issues. And so, in a 
sense, that makes Justice Kennedy less important—because it means 
he’s less distinctive. He just happens to agree with later median 
Justices on what the proper rule is. In fact, if Justice Kennedy had a 
distinctive rule that he was pivotal to, and if immediately that rule is 
overruled, that actually means that Justice Kennedy was more 
important—not enduring—but for the time that he was Justice, he 
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was absolutely necessary for that rule, and he was the person without 
whom that rule wouldn’t have existed. 
So, it’s not necessarily true that somebody who is more significant 
is going to be more enduring. It could go either way, I think. 
Professor Epstein: That strikes me as a variation on Mike Dorf’s 
earlier point. 
Professor Segall: Let’s bring this back to the ground just a little bit. 
From 2005 until June 30th, or whatever it was, of this year, in 
virtually every constitutional law, divided, five-four opinion, Justice 
Kennedy was in the majority. That’s a long time. And that transcends 
affirmative action, abortion, campaign-finance reform, and ten other 
things. Doesn’t that make him unbelievably important, Jonathan? 
Professor Adler: Hugely important, and this comes out in Lee’s 
data. Justice Kennedy was in the majority for 83% of the time in his 
entire career, but if you just look at the period of the Roberts Court, 
it’s in the 90s. With the exception of two terms in the Roberts Court, 
he was in the majority more than anyone else. The Chief Justice, who 
you would institutionally expect to be in the majority more than any 
other Justice just because of his being Chief, twice was one or two 
percentage points ahead of Kennedy. 
What that means is you can’t understand this period of the Court 
without understanding Justice Kennedy. And the other thing that I 
think that you don’t see as much in Lee’s data, but I think is 
important is that while Justice Kennedy was the median Justice, he 
was not the middle-of-the-road, split-the-difference Justice that 
arguably Justice O’Connor was at least in a certain set of cases. 
Justice Kennedy’s modal tendency as a Justice was to be a moderate 
conservative. That is to say, if you were to count by numbers, he was 
a moderate conservative in more cases than any other. 
But in some of the areas we’ve talked about today, where he really 
cared about the subject matter, he might not have been particularly 
moderate, and he might not have been particularly conservative. And 
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so, in those areas of the law, he still was defining the Court’s 
doctrine, but not in a split-the-difference way. When he cared about a 
particular First Amendment issue, Citizens United, he was arguably 
the farthest right Justice in that case, and he determined what the 
Court did, not Chief Justice Roberts. 
We could argue on issues like same-sex marriage, whether or not 
he was the furthest. But certainly, he was the one that made 
aggressive opinions in those areas possible, because he was the vote 
that the liberals on the Court were worried about losing. And so I 
think that makes him a particularly distinctive type of median Justice 
because he stands out when you look at the list of other people Lee 
identifies in terms of legacy, in terms of impact, on the shape of the 
court’s doctrine. 
And whether you like it or don’t like it, whether you think his 
opinions are going to last or not last, that means this period is defined 
by Justice Kennedy in a way that no period on the Court when Justice 
White was there is defined by Justice White, in a way that I don’t 
even think the ‘80s were defined by Justice O’Connor. That’s a type 
of significance that you can’t dismiss.  
Professor Epstein: Just to reinforce Jonathan’s point, if you look at 
the data, Kennedy is the only median to have been the median for an 
entire Chief Justice era. Nobody else can lay claim at least going 
back until 1937. That is a major distinction. 
Professor Segall: It’s late in the day, so I have a big question that I 
think is not data oriented, I don’t think. I agree with everything you 
just said, Jonathan, which is a sentence I hate uttering, but I do, I 
agree with everything— 
Professor Adler: I hope someone got that on tape. 
Professor Segall: I agree with everything you just said. So, we lived 
in a country from 2005 to 2017 where one person really directed 
almost the entire gamut of litigated constitutional law questions. 
Shouldn’t we maybe, and I think Lee’s going to say that was an 
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historical aberration, but shouldn’t we maybe rethink this idea that 
one person can have that much power. 
Professor Volokh: I don’t know that there’s anything inherently 
wrong with that. That is, whenever you have a bunch of decisions 
where you can put people on a spectrum and you have the single-
peaked-ness assumption and so on, mathematically there’s going to 
be a median, and whoever’s the median will determine the rule in 
that case. There’s going to be a median for a bunch of different cases. 
Now, sometimes it might turn out that coincidentally, one single 
person happens to be the median in a lot of areas. 
Now, should we attach any significance at all to the fact that a 
single person happens to be the median in all the areas because he’s 
most moderate on all things? Would it be better if we had two people, 
Kennedy and “Schmennedy,” and Kennedy happened to be the 
median on all of the hot button social-rights issues and 
“Schmennedy” was the median on all of the formalism, separation-
of-powers issues? Would it be better if you just happened to have two 
separate people? 
But I think that as long as every case has a median, then that’s just 
a mathematical property of the decision process. 
Professor Segall: Jonathan. 
Professor Adler: Yes and no. It’s the old joke that for the last decade 
it’s been Justice Kennedy’s world, and we just live in it or just try 
and teach it, or whatever. I agree it’s the nature of the process. And, 
if Lee was going to argue that it’s an aberration, I think I probably 
agree with that. There are certain things you would expect to see in a 
median that we didn’t see in Justice Kennedy. And there was a 
degree of stability, coalition stability, in that period, which I think is 
somewhat unusual at least as well. 
And so, it’s not clear to me that that is a permanent or enduring 
feature. We are arguably, depending on what Susan Collins is finally 
announcing at this moment and whatever else, entering what we 
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might characterize as the second Roberts Court, a Roberts Court 
that’s going to be different in many ways than the first Roberts Court, 
or what we might’ve called the Kennedy Court. Maybe Roberts will 
be the median on that Court, he will be a very different median. 
Is it going to matter that it’s one person? I’m not so sure, 
especially given that in 50% of the Court’s cases, it’s going to still be 
deciding things, nine-zero or eight-one. And for much of our legal 
system, those cases still really matter. 
Professor Volokh: I should mention that for pedagogical purposes, I 
do dislike—I’m going to agree with you on this pedagogical point. 
When I teach first-year con law, everyone comes into con law with 
opinions about whatever—they think it’s all going to be abortion, gay 
rights all the time. And they also come into it with basically the 
attitudinal model of voting—they realize that, “Oh yes, we’re all 
legal realists, and it all comes down to what you think about the 
merits of abortion.” 
In a sense, they are very close to thinking the doctrine is 
epiphenomenal. And I don’t mind that. I think legal realism is 
probably very true. But, I don’t want them to necessarily come to it 
with that view and stay strongly with that view. I like to undermine it 
when possible. So, I always like it when I teach the separation-of-
powers cases where there are cross-cutting, not left-right coalitions. 
That’s one reason why I also like to teach admin. So, there are areas 
where, even if it is still attitudinal, it’s attitudinal in a different way, 
and you have coalitions which are not left-right ones. 
In fact, I have data on this because I looked back for the last ten 
terms: What were the five-four decisions where the winning coalition 
did not include Kennedy? 
Professor Segall: In con law or across the board? 
Professor Volokh: Across all Supreme Court cases. SCOTUSblog 
and Harvard Law Review have statistics that are exactly designed for 
just that thing. And so, one big area is what we’ve talked about, the 
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criminal procedure decisions, the Apprendi-Blakely type things, and 
some Fourth Amendment things, and Confrontation Clause where 
either Scalia or Thomas or both join liberals. And so, you’ve got 
Carpenter in the last term, that’s a little bit different, but there’s 
Jardines and Alleyne, there’s Bullcoming, Magwood, Melendez-Diaz 
and Gant. So, you basically have these seven cases that are these kind 
of Blakely-style, I’m going to say— 
Professor Segall: Five-four cases? 
Professor Volokh: Yeah, five-four cases where it’s often, for 
example, a typical one would be Scalia, Thomas, Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, or Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan—
something like that. Then you have some where Kennedy has a very 
distinctive view, where he has a more First Amendment protective 
view and he just happens to be in the minority on that. So two cases 
in the 2014 term, Williams-Yulee, about judicial elections, and 
Walker, on the license plates. 
And then there are some which are more along the lines of very 
procedural, separation-of-powers cases, where you just have different 
coalitions like Hollingsworth, the Prop. 8 standing case, or Shady 
Grove Orthopedics, which is about Erie and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, where you just have coalitions that look very 
different. I just like that those cases exist, and I like to stress them. 
Professor Segall: Well, your data is interesting, and maybe you have 
the numbers for this— 
Professor Epstein: I just wanted to get back to your question about 
the value of a median. We’ve talked the first few minutes here, we’re 
talking about how distinctive Kennedy was, and one of the reasons he 
was so distinctive is that there was a reasonably sized gap between 
Kennedy and the right side of the Court and Kennedy in the left side 
of the Court, not so last term. And that’s very, very unusual. Usually, 
we have a softer middle. So, the left can jump over the median to 
make a coalition with the right, right with the left. 
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You’re very focused on Kennedy as the median, but he’s quite 
unusual. We’ll see a very different set of circumstances next term. 
Professor Adler: I’d like to just add one thing, too, about the gap 
that Lee’s data shows in terms of making Kennedy more of a super 
median and so on. Combine that with the persistence over multiple 
terms is really where you get the significance because any given term 
the mixes of cases is such that you’re not getting a full cross-section 
of the range of cases that the Court experiences. You can imagine 
mixes of cases that produce lots of different Justices as medians if 
you don’t have this characteristic that Lee just identified of the space 
to either side of that Justice. 
And it’s that space that means that in term after term with different 
mixes of cases, with different issues before the Court, you replicate 
the same phenomenon. It would be really interesting, and I think 
peculiar, if that dynamic where to reassert itself in the near future. 
Professor Segall: I’m obviously more critical of the institution than 
other people, but if Hillary Clinton wins, and Merrick Garland gets 
on the Court, and Kennedy stays on longer or whatever, we may be 
entering a polarized age where any moderate, conservative or 
moderate, liberal Justice is going to be the median. So I agree with—
your data is what your data is, and Kennedy was a historical 
aberration to that point. I think we live in a Merrick Garland-
dominated—it’s possible we live in Merrick Garland-dominated 
world if Hillary Clinton wins the election. 
That’s a hypothetical that obviously could have happened. One 
other question, though, Lee. I assume from your data that if a 
historian was writing today and looking at the Supreme Court over 
time, Justice Kennedy has been the most dominant Justice by far in a 
very long time. 
Professor Epstein: On virtually any indicator I can think of. If you 
can think of one I haven’t, then— 
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Professor Segall: Well, I don’t understand your—I’m not a data 
person, but I don’t understand your data because my understanding is 
in virtually every year of the Roberts Court, Kennedy was in the 
majority in over 90% of the five-four decisions. 
Professor Volokh: Yes. I am not making a point that these cases are 
dominant or anything. I totally agree. It’s interesting when we talk 
about median Justices, I find it interesting to stress that—let me put it 
this way: merely talking about Kennedy as the median Justice, I 
think, gives a lot of emphasis to a strict, not just attitudinal model of 
voting, but a strict left-right attitudinal model of voting. 
And I just think it’s useful to point out to people, and in particular 
to point out to beginning students, that it’s not all like that—that 
much of it is like that, and the attitudinal model is not wrong, and 
legal realism is not wrong. But it’s useful to look at areas where 
either there might not be a median, or the median is something 
different, or the coalition is different. Just by way of comparison, my 
total list of all the cases for the last ten terms where there was a five-
four majority that didn’t include Kennedy—there are twenty-six of 
them, so it’s not a large set, but I just find it’s useful to talk about 
them. 
Professor Segall: I mean, twenty-six out of seven hundred—not 
seven hundred, this is just five-four cases. 
Professor Volokh: Only five-four cases. 
Professor Segall: I do want to make one comment about your—well, 
Jonathan, this is a recurrent theme of our Twitter wars. Jonathan likes 
to point out that 50% of the Court’s cases are nine-nothing or 
eight-one or seven-two, whatever, or some high percentage. And 
there’s an important point about that, which is, they select their own 
cases, and they’re not going to take seventy-five cases, or seventy 
cases out of seventy-five, that raise ideological issues that will divide 
them because they know—at least in the current seventeen years—
they knew if they did that, if they were five-four 80% of the time, 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss5/6
2019] PANEL 6: THE MEDIAN JUSTICE 1047 
90% of the time, the American people would view that institution 
very differently than when they are unanimous 50% of the time. And 
they control that. 
Professor Adler: I don’t think that’s the dynamic at all. This Court 
more than any Court, certainly in my lifetime, but in a long time. 
Yes, it’s a discretionary docket. The mandatory appeals docket has 
shrunk to almost nothing. It’s almost a pure certiorari docket. It’s 
also a Court that applies what you may characterize as traditional 
criteria for certiorari very strictly. That is to say this Court is really 
looking heavily for Circuit splits or other things that are distinct 
reasons to grant, such as the striking down of a federal statute. 
It’s rare that they take a case that doesn’t fall into one of those two 
categories. There are a handful a year, really not very many, and the 
vast majority are Circuit splits. So what that means is that they are 
only taking cases in which really smart, really thoughtful lower court 
judges have already disagreed with each other. You can argue that 
they don’t take every Circuit-split case every year, but if you look at 
the ones that they deny, there often are obvious vehicle problems, or 
they’re cases where there’s at least a plausible argument that they 
want things to percolate. 
And so, to me at least, when you look at that, the fact that they’re 
not five to four in virtually all of those cases is the remarkable thing 
because they are picking cases that lower courts have already shown 
people operating in good faith are going to split on. And the fact that 
they can be 9–0 in even 30% of those cases is notable. They are 
taking the hardest cases about which we would least expect 
unanimity and finding unanimity a decent number of times. And 
when they split five-four, I forget the exact number, I think it’s about 
two thirds of the time it’s on ideological lines or about that amount 
during the Roberts Court. And you’d expect that of the five-four 
cases. But I look at the data, and I say, “It’s surprising they’re not 
splitting that way more often within the nature of the docket now.” 
11
et al.: Panel 6: The Median Justice
Published by Reading Room,
1048 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
Professor Epstein: Isn’t your only point really that they can use 
docket control to look more or less political? 
Professor Segall: I have two points. That’s one of them. And I think 
they—I’m not saying they sit in a room and say, “We’re not going to 
take,” but I think it does happen. Justice O’Connor at this law school, 
albeit after her retirement, was asked about her favorite cases, least 
favorite cases. And she gave a remarkable answer that in some ways 
wasn’t a very nice answer. But she said two things. She said, “I just 
never—Native American cases just drove me nuts, and, of course, 
nobody ever wants an ERISA case.” That’s a direct quote. “Nobody 
ever wants an ERISA case.” It’s pretty much a direct quote. 
Professor Volokh: It’s not wrong. 
Professor Segall: It’s not wrong. I wouldn’t know, but yeah, I think 
it’s not wrong. I think, Jonathan, one of the points that you are 
overlooking is there are a lot—we have clerks here, all kinds of 
Supreme Court clerks here, and I did not clerk for the Supreme 
Court. But it is my impression, talking to people and observing, that 
there are many cases they don’t care that much about, and when they 
don’t care that much about it, they will join a unanimous or eight-one 
or seven-two decision without spending a lot of time and angst on it. 
And Justice O’Connor implied that pretty strongly when she was 
here. 
Professor Adler: That might be true, but if I’m the Chief Justice-- 
and remember,—if we’re going to identify a single member of the 
Court who’s responsible for this shrinking docket, Rehnquist clearly 
had a role in that when he was Chief and Roberts does now, but if his 
goal is to make the Court look less political by having more 
unanimous decisions, you don’t have a sixty-five-case term. 
If your goal is to have a Court that looks less political by having 
more unanimous opinions, you would grant an additional forty cases 
that you know are all going to come out nine-zero, and then your 
numbers look great. So, if that’s what we think is going on, that 
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doesn’t explain the behavior that we see. It may be that when it 
comes to ERISA, no one’s going to go to the mat fighting over how 
to interpret the third comma in a sentence or something. 
I’d accept that. But if cert. is being used to make the Court look 
less political, they’re doing the exact opposite of what they would be 
doing if that was their goal. 
Professor Epstein: Take sixty-five ERISA cases. 
Professor Adler: Well, they could do that too. 
Professor Volokh: By the way, I suspect that if we looked at some 
term where the conference notes were available, then there will be a 
lot of cases where it’s not that there was some initial division at 
conference, but then, because it was a very low-stakes case, everyone 
decided to join what was initially a five-four vote. I think at 
conference you would even find that it was nine-zero in the voting, 
so it actually probably even looked easy to the law clerks and in the 
initial discussions in chambers. 
Professor Segall: The docket has shrunk significantly. That’s clearly 
true. There may be different theories about that. Certainly, Judge 
Posner would have some interesting theories about that. One of 
which is, it has nothing to do with what you were mentioning, but 
they just want to do less work with their four law clerks. Do you 
think the Court uses docket control to appear less ideological? 
Professor Epstein: I think it certainly did in the 2016 term. It was a 
very low-key term. There were no big constitutional cases on the 
docket. They had their most consensual term in about fifty years. 
Professor Segall: You’re baiting me here. You mean the term they 
were four-four? That evenly divided four-four term? 
Professor Epstein: But it was a lot of other things going on. There 
was the Merrick Garland fight. There was an election. It’s 
overdetermined why they did it, but they did it. 
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Professor Adler: And they are behind now. The long conference this 
year produced I think only five grants or something. And we can 
understand that. I think if you want to tie Kennedy into this, I think 
the Chief Justice’s vision of a Court that is less political or that is 
more like the umpire --you can ignore and not the fret about the balls 
and strikes part. Think about his comment—about Roberts’s 
comment—about how(I’m going to paraphrase it), you don’t go to 
the game to watch the umpire. If you’re talking about the behavior of 
the umpire after the game, that wasn’t a good game. You want to be 
talking about the players. 
So, for that vision of the Court, docket control, taking fewer cases 
means fewer calls the umpire has to make. And when you look at the 
Chief Justice’s approach to questions of justiciability, you see that. 
And what’s interesting about Justice Kennedy is Justice Kennedy, for 
a variety of reasons, wasn’t on board with that broader project of 
reducing the number of cases. He had a tendency to often vote on the 
margin with conservatives on whether there are implied rights of 
action and standing on lots of things, but often in ways that would not 
fully close the door, Vieth being a good example of that. 
But even in standing cases. In Lujan, he joins Scalia’s opinion, but 
he has to write the separate opinion. “You know what, if Joyce Kelly 
had bought a plane ticket, maybe she’d have standing,” which 
meant— 
Professor Segall: Or if Congress defined the law better. 
Professor Adler: Right. And then so Massachusetts v. EPA comes 
along. My view of that case is, is that the standing arguments, which 
you know I was sympathetic to, but the arguments that there weren’t 
standing were very strong arguments. If Massachusetts didn’t have 
standing, then it was possible that no climate-change plaintiff had 
standing. And for someone like Justice Kennedy, that would mean 
closing the door completely. He wasn’t willing to do that. He was 
willing to kind of push it partially closed, the way Chief Justice 
Roberts would like to do, but he wouldn’t go that full distance. 
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And then again, for Chief Justice Roberts, that’s, “Let’s take the 
Court out of the game.” Justice Kennedy wanted to at least the option 
of being in the game. 
Professor Segall: On that point, in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the 
Court granted standing kind of surprisingly, I think, to Massachusetts 
to challenge an administrative rule that affects global warming 
maybe, Justice Rehnquist had said several times in the 1970s, and 
this is almost a direct quote, “The fact that no one would have 
standing does not mean that’s a reason to find standing,” and I think 
Justice Kennedy thought the fact that no one would have standing 
would be the exact reason to find standing consistent with the judicial 
supremacy Steve Griffin talked about. 
Professor Epstein: I think Jonathan makes an excellent point. I 
agree with his analysis that this is one of the bigger changes as the 
median moves, there’s others, of course, but as the median moves 
from Kennedy to Roberts. 
Professor Segall: Yes. And my question about that is do we think—
Erwin Chemerinsky has been going around the country giving 
speeches saying this will be the first Court since, I don’t know, mid 
‘70s or early ‘70s without a moderate, a true moderate median Justice 
if we think Kennedy’s a moderate. How is this lack of a median—
unless Chief Justice Roberts changes his spots, he’s not going to be 
anywhere near as left as Kennedy. How is this going to affect the 
future of the Court? 
Professor Epstein: Well, it’s a median in name only, in a sense. If 
all these hot-button cases, closely divided cases, are simply five-four, 
with the Democrats on one side and all the Republicans on the other, 
it doesn’t look the same. It’s a very different kind of Court. But, I 
take Jonathan’s points very seriously on how Roberts can play that 
median role. 
Professor Adler: We talked already about how you can define 
medians along different dimensions, and the way Roberts is a median 
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Justice in some respects is his minimalism, not necessarily a left-right 
thing. And we know that there are reasons to suspect that Justice 
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch aren’t really sympathetic to the 
minimalist approach the way Scalia wasn’t either. There are all these 
opinions where Scalia would—with Roberts, but also even in the 
Rehnquist Court, we talked about Webster earlier—where Scalia 
would criticize the Court for not going where he thought the logic of 
the analysis needed to go. 
And so, there will be an interesting dynamic where Roberts, for a 
different set of reasons, if he follows what we’ve seen from him over 
the last ten years, will often be trying to get majority opinions that do 
a little bit in most cases. There are obviously a handful of issues 
where Roberts is willing to set aside his minimalist tendencies for 
other things that matter to him. But this will create a very different 
dynamic. He will be looking for ways in which we can split the 
difference a little bit in a way that Kennedy, especially when 
Kennedy was writing, he wasn’t as interested in. 
And that’s very different— 
Professor Segall: And that’s a big difference, I think, between 
Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor. Justice O’Connor was very 
much a “this day only”—is that a fair description of the type of 
Justice she was? Whereas Kennedy was not a one-day-only guy. 
Kennedy was a “let’s resolve this issue.” In many cases like Citizens 
United and other cases. Are there benefits to having a strong median 
Justice when the country is so polarized? 
Professor Adler: I hope so. 
Professor Volokh: I think my answer to that, actually, it goes along 
with my gut reaction to what you said Chemerinsky was saying. 
Often, when Justices are characterized as being conservative, liberal, 
moderate, or whatever, it may be somewhat tendentious. I know that, 
for example, the late Judge Reinhardt used to say that there were 
conservatives and there were moderates on the Court. But if you 
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talked to some other subset of my friends, they would say, “Yeah, 
there are liberals on the Court and there are moderates.” 
So, when you say that this is going to be the first time that we 
don’t have a moderate because Roberts is no moderate or something, 
that doesn’t really have an objective meaning, but there is, 
mathematically, a median. And in fact, one consequence of having a 
median where there’s a lot of empty space on the left and right of that 
median is then you can define that median as having a lot of power. 
If you have a median that clusters together with others, that median 
Justice actually has less power, especially if they’re close to someone 
else. They might switch around, and you might have many Justices 
playing the role of a median. 
Now, I’ve said earlier, I don’t know if that’s particularly 
meaningful, but if you think that there is something problematic with 
someone really being so in the middle and actually being moderate 
when others are not, and then there’s a lot of room for them to move 
around, then you do have one individual having a lot more power. 
Professor Segall: Lee, do you agree with Sasha’s skepticism about 
characterizing judges as liberal, conservative, and that data being— 
Professor Epstein: After sitting here all day, absolutely not. Even 
the most doctrinal among you are characterizing either the left side of 
the court, the right side of the court, the liberals, the Democrats. So, 
no. 
Professor Segall: You don’t agree, or you do agree? 
Professor Epstein: I don’t agree with—I’m not skeptical about it, 
especially, as I said, after sitting here and listening to people who 
think that there’s some doctrine left on the courts talking about the 
Court in political terms. 
Professor Segall: I think most political scientists think that data 
about liberal, conservative judges is very valuable and tells a real 
story. Assuming that’s true for a moment, how do we fairly 
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characterize Justice Kennedy’s career? Do we characterize him as a 
liberal? Obviously not. As a conservative? I don’t think so, but 
maybe. Moderate conservative? Where does he fall? 
Professor Epstein: Well, in terms of the data, he generally voted 
with the conservative side of the Court. There were a few areas 
we’ve talked about today where he moved over and joined liberals, 
and that’s why, when you look at the data, the probability that he was 
the median Justice is so high because he occasionally made that 
move over, but not all that often. 
Professor Segall: Is it just a function of numbers? 
Professor Epstein: You’re looking at the wrong person. 
Professor Segall: This might be the most serious question I’ve asked 
today, I don’t know. It turns out that if Justice Kennedy had different 
views on abortion, gay rights, and term limits, and maybe, like, 
Citizens United. Those four cases. If one person had different views 
on those four cases, this country is so different. Millions of gays and 
lesbians wouldn’t be able to get married today. I think Citizens 
United has had an effect on our politics, even if it didn’t directly 
affect our politics. Obviously, without Kennedy, Roe v. Wade gets 
overturned in 1992. How can lay people understand how important 
that is? 
Abortion can be illegal in twenty-six states. Gays may not have the 
right to get married. Citizens United could never have happened, and 
we can keep going on. What does that tell us about either Justice 
Kennedy, the Court, or the system of judicial review that we have in 
this country? 
Professor Volokh: I’m still going to push back on the idea that it’s 
meaningful that all of those four points coincide in a single person. If 
people’s views were less correlated among issues, you would have 
four separate people, and then you would say, “Well, if Kennedy had 
a different view on gay rights and if Breyer had a different view on 
abortion and if Sotomayor had a different view on Citizens United,” 
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and so you imagine a different world where you change one person in 
one dimension, then that’s the identical different world. So, is it 
meaningful that those dimensions are sufficiently correlated, that 
they’re all combined in one person? 
Professor Segall: That’s the question I’m asking because from 2005 
to 2017, and even before 2005 on some very important issues, Justice 
Kennedy went to his—I’m asking very human question here. Justice 
Kennedy went to his chambers, and he knew how he voted mattered. 
That’s not true for Sotomayor, and it’s not true for Scalia in many 
cases. It is only true, in most cases that we care about and that we’re 
talking about, for Justice Kennedy for a very long period of time, 
which is why we’re having this symposium today. We didn’t have—
Justice O’Connor was a very important Justice, and there should’ve 
been symposiums about her, but Justice Kennedy was the most 
important. So, I’m not sure I understand your point. 
Professor Volokh: Well, I will agree with you in one sense, which is 
that Kennedy’s vote really mattered in a very specific way. Now, 
while I definitely agree with the idea of the median Justice, I think 
we should also not lose sight of the different other types of power 
that are wielded on the Court. For example, if I’m Justice Thomas, 
my vote doesn’t matter in the sense that my view actually determines 
the rule, but my view determines who the median is—I have to be 
there voting so that this particular person is median, and if you take 
me off and you put Justice Marshall back, then someone else is the 
median. So, my vote matters in the sense that everyone’s vote 
matters—in the sense that they determine who the median is. 
Also, there’s a lot of very interesting literature, which one ought to 
read in conjunction with all of Lee’s papers. For example, who is the 
median in the distribution matters, but now my colleague at Emory in 
the political science department, Cliff Carrubba, has a recent article 
where he says: what the majority is depends on people’s views about 
who wins the case, but if they also have different views on what is 
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the optimal legal rule, then once the majority of five Justices is 
determined, there’s also a median of that winning coalition. 
And the median Justice of the winning coalition has a more limited 
median Justice power to decide what the rule is going to be—out of 
the many rules that that coalition could sign onto. Then, in addition, 
Lax and Cameron have a view that the opinion author has power 
when they’re writing opinions. So, if you’ve got a five-four majority 
and the Chief feels that Kennedy is squishy, he can assign that to 
Kennedy—because that way, Kennedy will write an opinion that he 
agrees with. But if Kennedy is solid, then the Chief can assign the 
opinion to Scalia, and then Scalia has a certain ability to choose what 
the rule is, just constrained by the constraint that Kennedy shouldn’t 
defect from it—but if Kennedy is solid, that gives Scalia a lot of 
maneuvering room. 
There actually are a lot of different kinds of power that different 
Justices have, and it’s not just the single one power that is wielded by 
the median. In the simplest political science model, yes, the one 
median Justice would have all the power, but because of the 
institutional features and dynamics of the Supreme Court, you 
actually have a lot of centers of power in lots of different cases. 
Professor Epstein: I will make you happy, and I will say that yes, 
Justice Kennedy was a very, very powerful Justice in some very 
important cases. How’s that? And everybody knew it. All the other 
Justices understood that they were living in Justice Kennedy’s world. 
The only thing I would add is, and I guess we’ll find out soon 
enough, is the effect that Justice Kennedy had on the docket. Were 
there areas of the law that both sides of the Court avoided because 
they were uncertain on how Justice Kennedy would vote in those 
cases? And just a caveat to you, the median Justice model in my little 
report, it’s a voting model. It doesn’t say anything about the doctrine 
or the law. That’s not the concern. It’s all about outcomes and votes. 
Professor Segall: And certainly, Adam Winkler, who is a pretty 
foremost gun, Second Amendment expert, he’s written some articles, 
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and I’ve written some, too, suggesting we’ve not seen a gun case 
since McDonald because no one knew how Justice Kennedy was 
going to vote. 
Professor Epstein: We’ll find out soon enough if that’s the 
explanation for the decline in the docket. 
Professor Segall: Anyone else have any comments? 
Professor Adler: I agree with that. I think what’s interesting is that 
in different periods in the Supreme Court’s history, we often identify 
one or two Justices that we think had a particular influence on the 
course of doctrine in the course of the Court. It’s usually been the 
Chief, not always, but there are institutional reasons we would expect 
that to be the case. And, to underline the point—in part the point of 
this conference—it is the combination of being the Justice that had 
such a dominant role on the doctrine in high profile areas while being 
the median Justice but not necessarily being a moderate, that 
constellation of factors is distinct. 
And so, when we talk about the Kennedy Court, we’re talking 
about a different type of influence over the Court than when we talk 
about periods of the Court that are, say, defined by particular Chief 
Justices who, using various forms of power within the Court had a 
very big effect on the shape of doctrine and the types of cases the 
Court would take and so on. And so that’s why this day has been a 
worthwhile day because he was having an effect on the Court that 
was significant and distinct and worthy of trying to understand. 
Professor Epstein: But Eric, it really brings me back to my earlier 
question, is fame fleeting for him? You point out abortion, you point 
out affirmative action. Okay, not Obergefell, but the Obergefell 
progeny that Pam Karlan talked about. Does this all just vanish 
within a decade? 
Professor Segall: When Jonathan was talking, I was thinking 
Holmes and Frankfurter and Marshall. I don’t know—I’d be very 
surprised if 50 years from now Kennedy is viewed in that way, 
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though he was more dominant certainly than any of—maybe not 
Marshall—but certainly, more than the other Justices. 
Professor Epstein: So was Clark in the ‘50s. So was Reed in the 
‘40s. 
Professor Adler: I think the gay-rights decisions, and Obergefell in 
particular—I don’t think they’re going away. How broadly they 
extend is a separate issue, but they’re not going to go away, and 
they’re always going to be tied to him. And I think what’s more 
likely to happen is that fifty years from now, the cultural 
understanding of Justice Kennedy will just be about those cases and 
that the other aspects of his jurisprudence, that for right now are so 
significant and meaningful in terms of the doctrine that we deal with 
today, that might be what we forget. And so, Justice Kennedy, as we 
noted, was conservative most of the time in five-four cases in the 
Roberts Court. He voted with the conservatives close to two-thirds of 
the time in those cases where the Court split along left-right lines. 
That may well be forgotten. His role in abortion jurisprudence 
might be somewhat forgotten depending on what happens, but I do 
think that his legacy on gay rights is something that—it’s hard for me 
to imagine a course of history in which that gets forgotten. That’s 
going to be in high-school textbooks. 
Professor Segall: Anytime someone starts a sentence with, “It’s hard 
to imagine in the course of history,” I think, “Donald Trump is 
President,” and I—you know. 
Professor Volokh: I think when we talk about whose legacy is going 
to be enduring—earlier on the panel, I said that if you take the 
simplest model where any decision can just be overruled, then 
everything is just determined by who is the median tomorrow. 
Whereas, if you have a model where opinions are somehow costly to 
overrule, then you get something different. And so, I think that gets 
us to a way of distinguishing what kind of opinions are likely to be 
more enduring than others. 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss5/6
2019] PANEL 6: THE MEDIAN JUSTICE 1059 
One is just a pure doctrinalism point: if you write an opinion 
which is so mushy that anyone can make anything of it, then that’s 
great. That opinion is going to be precedent forever, but the content 
of that opinion is going to constantly change because it can be 
reinterpreted. That’s why the abortion right can be radically reduced 
without ever overruling Roe and Casey, or gun rights can be 
dramatically reduced without ever overruling Heller and McDonald. 
And on the other hand, if you have a rule that’s easy to state and hard 
to misapply, then as long as it doesn’t get outright overruled, which 
itself is costly, then that might have more staying power. 
And then another type of doctrinal innovation that might have 
more staying power is one that actually changes facts on the ground. 
If you have an opinion that imposes gay marriage on places in the 
country where it wouldn’t otherwise have existed politically, then 
you have people actually getting married and actually making lives 
for themselves. And that creates a different reality on the ground, 
which will be very difficult for later legislative majorities to undo, 
and it will be difficult for later judges to undo. On the other hand, 
probably the legal availability of abortion is not something that has 
engendered those kinds of reliance interests. So, I would say that 
abortion and gay marriage are kind of different in that sense. 
Professor Segall: I agree with that. Why don’t we take some 
questions and then we will call this day to an end. Anybody? Go 
ahead. Don’t be shy. Speak in the microphone. 
Professor Ilya Somin: I was going to let other people go because 
I had asked questions on previous panels, but since they’re not going 
yet, I guess I’ll ask one on this one. I guess my question is primarily 
for Eric, though others can jump in. I’m trying to understand the 
nature of your objection to Kennedy’s role. Is it simply that you 
disliked the fact that one person casts a pivotal vote because it’s a 
close five-four decision or that you dislike the fact that it’s the same 
person in a bunch of issue areas, or is it some combination of the 
two? And if it is really that it’s ultimately about one person, does that 
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suggest maybe we shouldn’t have other aspects of our political 
system where one person makes huge decisions? 
Obviously, the President, for example, can make huge decisions 
even about war and peace in many cases. They can ruin the lives of 
many people, and that has happened. So, does that suggest that 
maybe we should have a plural executive, where it’s legitimate or 
fundamentally wrong for one person to make those decisions? Or, if 
it’s only wrong on the Supreme Court, should there be a rule that 
Supreme Court decisions must be at least six-three or seven-two or 
something? So how would you resolve these matters? What’s the 
principle that actually concerns you here? 
Professor Segall: Well, first of all, I am on record many times over 
as saying Justice Kennedy was our most transparent Justice and so 
just within the system we currently have, I think justice—I disagreed 
with him probably 75% of the time because I’m a progressive. But, I 
think the way he did it was the best we can hope for because he did it 
honestly and transparently and didn’t care very much about hiding 
behind doctrines and legal rules. I think his median Justice 
importance for seventeen years, and really before that, because other 
than affirmative action when Justice O’Connor was the median, I 
think he was the median before that too. 
I think it is lunacy for a democracy to have a highest court in the 
land staffed by death, illness, or politically timed retirements. And 
because our Supreme Court is a roll of the dice in many regards, if 
Justice Marshall stays on six more months, American history is 
changed forever because there’s no Clarence Thomas on the Supreme 
Court. There is no Citizens United. There is no Heller. There is no 
Adarand. There is no any of those cases. So, Justice Kennedy is just 
kind of the logical conclusion to an illogical system that gives an 
unelected, life-tenured, government official this much power. 
This human being knew for seventeen years that on virtually every 
issue of constitutional law, what he said would be the rule of law for 
the United States. A system that leads to that result, I think is a little 
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bit loony, which is why I’m in favor of four-four, evenly divided 
court. But leaving that aside, the President is elected, and the 
Congress is elected, and we can be cynical about that and public-
choice theory and all, but there is a difference between the role the 
President is supposed to play and the role the median Justice is 
supposed to play. 
My objection isn’t to Kennedy per se. I do object to a system that 
gave rise—and by the way, lay, smart, informed, non-lawyer-type 
people understand this very, very well. Why would we as country 
cede to one person, for seventeen years, pretty much unique 
responsibility over all of these social and cultural issues that divide 
us as a country? That’s my answer. 
Professor Volokh: But it seems to me that what you’re saying really 
would apply with equal force if every five-four decision were 
decided by a different five-four majority? 
Professor Segall: No, I don’t think so because it’s— 
Professor Volokh: It’s the fact that there are these five-four 
decisions— 
Professor Segall: You’re ignoring human dynamics. You’re ignoring 
the idea that one person—the Showtime Lakers, I do think, would 
have beaten Michael Jordan’s Bulls because they had two or three 
more weapons and tools, and the dynamic changes when people have 
multiple responsibilities. And I think putting all this responsibility on 
one person, who loved it, obviously, I think, is not the same as 
having a revolving door of Justices who matter. 
Professor Adler: Let me suggest that in one sense, your complaint 
actually agrees with an argument made by Justice Scalia, although I 
think he would’ve formulated it a little differently. His formulation is 
that the more aggressive the Court gets with judicial review, the more 
the consequence of who is on the Court is. Now, he would argue that 
had implications for what sorts of doctrines you wanted and so on. 
Let’s just set that aside, but one way of viewing that is the structure 
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of the Court: Is it an odd number or an even number of Justices? 
What their decision rule is in terms of majority votes, who are 
majority vote, and so on? That’s one way of thinking about it. 
The other way of thinking about it might be, well, what sorts of 
questions does the Court get to decide? And while Scalia didn’t 
always exhibit this in his own jurisprudence, but one answer would 
be, well, have the Court decide less, and just leave a lot more to the 
political process. And then when Justice Kennedy retires and the 
President nominates his replacement, we don’t have what we’ve 
witnessed the last several weeks, which is political trench warfare 
over the replacement because of our beliefs and predictions about 
what that replacement will or won’t mean. 
That would be an alternative. It would be radically restricting 
judicial review, which you might be in favor of or sympathetic to. I 
think the Chief Justice is. 
Professor Segall: Scalia’s dissent in Casey—one quick point—
Scalia’s dissent in Casey is perfect, except that he didn’t abide by it 
in 131 cases where he struck down state and federal laws. Go ahead, 
Lee, sorry. 
Professor Epstein: I was just going to say Robert Bork originally 
made that argument, and there is a reasonable amount of empirical 
data to support it. 
Professor Segall: I am making that argument today in my new book 
for the record. All right, go ahead. 
Joyce Lewis: Hi, Joyce Lewis, and I just dropped the microphone, 
not on purpose. My question kind of goes to what Professor Segall 
was saying and kind of goes to what Professor Volokh was saying. 
Don’t we want the Justices on the Supreme Court to have to persuade 
each other and to bring each other together into some sort of a 
consensus opinion that provides clarity? And if we want that, to your 
point, it can be a different Justice for each important decision. Isn’t 
that what our system has historically? And then Dr. Epstein, please 
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chime in if I’m wrong about that, but historically, isn’t that where we 
have wanted our Supreme Court to be? 
Haven’t we wanted there to be collegiality, discussion, persuasion 
in order to come up with the best answer as opposed to vesting all of 
the decision making, as you’re describing it, in one person who is 
sort of anointed or everyone has decided is the median Justice and the 
person who’s ultimately going to control the decision making? 
Professor Volokh: I would say no one anointed Justice Kennedy. 
I’m imagining that there’s some guy in Ohio, maybe it might be an 
actual really moderate person in Ohio who says, “You know, I 
somehow find myself agreeing with every decision that’s made in 
America because though America sometimes makes left decisions 
and sometimes right decisions, I always agree with them. It must be 
that exactly 150 million people are more left than me and exactly 150 
million people are more right than me. And I am this median guy.” 
Now, no one anointed this person. So, there’s no reason, by 
definition, that this person’s views hold. It’s just that, 
mathematically, someone’s going to be the median. 
And so that’s just the way, mathematically, that decisions get 
made. So, I don’t find it problematic that someone’s the median. And 
then if it turns out that people’s views are highly correlated, so the 
same person’s the median on lots of issues, it’s just the contingency 
that that person happens to agree with everything that’s being done. 
And it’s not his fault. It’s not to his credit. It just so happens that 
some rule has to be chosen, and it happens to be the rule that person 
agrees with. Now, as a matter of “Do we want there to be 
deliberation and winning people over to consensus” and so on? Quite 
frankly, I don’t know whether that’s good. 
If people come to the Supreme Court with their deeply felt views, 
they’re not really persuadable because they’ve thought about these 
views for twenty years, and those are their views. And the same goes 
for Congress. Do I want people in Congress to persuade each other or 
rather to just vote their view? I don’t have a strong belief about that. I 
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think if just everyone went to Congress and voted their view that they 
were totally unpersuadable about and that would be the result, I think 
that would be a fine way to run a democracy too. I’ve never been a 
big devotee of the deliberative model of democracy rather than just 
the attitudinal model of democracy. So, I don’t know that that’s so 
great. 
But regardless, someone’s going to be the median because that’s 
just, mathematically, how things shake out, and it just turns out that 
Kennedy was the one. So, I don’t find that problematic. 
Professor Adler: I would say in terms of the question as a historical 
matter, I don’t think the Court was necessarily created with this idea 
in mind. In fact, if you look at the early fights over populating the 
Court, we certainly saw a lot of what we would characterize today as 
partisan infighting. But, certainly, Chief Justice Marshall felt that 
ending the practice of seriatim opinions, making the Court speak with 
one voice was important. You can find lots of very significant cases 
in the 19th century where Justices would dissent and didn’t feel the 
need to write an opinion, which would be unheard of now. There was 
some where Justice Chase was, I guess, too ill to write his dissent in 
Bradwell. 
But a lot of times it’s just, “You know, yeah, I disagree, but this is 
the opinion of the Court,” and we certainly know on the Warren 
Court that Earl Warren felt very strongly that when the Court used its 
institutional capital in certain sorts of cases, it was important to be 
able to speak as the Court. And I think Chief Justice Roberts aspires 
to that. We can argue whether or not it’s too late in the game for that. 
So, I think that that’s worthwhile and whether or not we’ve gotten to 
a point where there’s too much focus on the individual personalities 
to restore that sort of thing, I think it’s an interesting question. 
But certainly, looking at the history, I think it’s hard to dismiss the 
idea that there is value in the Court having an institutional voice that 
can be seen as bridging other political divides. And again, that may 
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be a historical artifact that we will never have again. It may be 
something that we could aspire to. I don’t know. 
Professor Epstein: For a very long time we had a pretty strong norm 
of consensus on the Supreme Court. If you go back to docket books 
in the 1870s, you’ll see that the Justices disagreed as much as they do 
today, but they didn’t make those disagreements public. That norm 
exists on many European courts. They don’t make disagreements 
public. They try to work it out, try to reach consensus. I’ve sat 
through entire political science conferences where we’ve debated, “Is 
a norm of consensus good?” I know no one single answer. 
Professor Segall: Justice Kagan has made it a point in the last year 
to repeatedly say more than three or four times that the four-four 
Court had the advantage of exactly what you were talking about, they 
had to persuade each other more, they had to write narrower 
opinions. Now, she’s very clear, she doesn’t want that forever, but 
she is saying that a lot for the reasons you talked about. So, I just 
wanted to mention that. Go ahead. 
Professor Corinna Lain: Corinna Lain, Richmond. One thing that 
I have not been able to get my head around with this—and I thought 
maybe we would talk about it, we’re at the end of the conference, I 
thought I would raise it now—and it is that Kennedy chose to retire 
now, and I just think, “Wow, for the guy who’s so much about 
dignity and the civilized conversation, it’s surprising to me.” I would 
have guessed, not this President, doesn’t get to—and especially 
knowing, because he did know how much power he had for 
seventeen years, so it’s bizarre to me that he chose now. And I even 
thought, “Okay, if you can’t hang on, would you hang on past the 
midterms?” Because frankly, if you thought— 
Then at least it’s up to the people, and it’s like they either change 
the Senate or they don’t, but then it forces a compromise, or it 
doesn’t. But democracy sort of had its way. I’m wondering what your 
thoughts are on that. 
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Professor Adler: I’m not surprised he decided now. If you think 
about what are the cases that Justice Kennedy’s written that I think he 
cares about that are most likely at risk, I think it’d be reasonable for 
him to say that Citizens United was more at risk were he replaced by 
a Democratic president than Obergefell is if he’s replaced by 
Republican, if for no other reason than public opinion; both Sanders 
and Clinton said in the campaign that Citizens United would be a 
litmus test. 
On abortion, his opinion is kind of in the middle. He doesn’t want 
the outcome that a likely Democratic nominee would want, which 
would be kind of elimination of Casey to a more permissive regime, 
just as he might not want the elimination of the right altogether. And 
he did vote with the Right more often with the Left in five-four cases. 
It’s about two thirds of the time. He did see himself as a Republican. 
If you listened to the oral argument in cases like Janus, it’s clear that 
insofar as we’re on teams or whatever else, that was what he thought 
was his team. And so, I think there’s a certain logic to it. 
Professor Segall: Are you suggesting his retirement was politically 
timed? Is that what you’re suggesting? 
Professor Adler: I’m saying that if you try and think about what 
mattered to Kennedy, as opposed to what might matter to us about 
Kennedy, I think it actually makes a lot of sense. And I think there’s 
some other things you can add to the picture. I think, and one day we 
may see conference notes that confirm this, I think there are issues 
that we don’t associate with him that were important to him, even 
though he didn’t write on them. One data point: One of his last 
opinions is a concurrence in this case called Pereira. It’s an 
administrative law case, and he writes this concurrence about how 
lower courts are not applying Chevron sufficiently stringently 
enough, that quotes Gorsuch’s lower court’s opinions challenging 
Chevron, that quotes Thomas, that’s very much in line with his vote 
in the Arlington case, very much in line with his opinion in Gonzales 
v. Oregon. 
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And if he’s thinking about what is a Justice that’s appointed by 
Donald Trump with the advice of Don McGahn likely to think about 
this issue? And again, if you look at Justice Kennedy’s opinion, if 
you look at his voting, it’s hard to not see this issue mattering to him. 
So I think when you look at this together, it would make some sense. 
I also suspect that the Gorsuch nomination, the partisan aspect of 
how that confirmation played out, and the appellate nominations of 
the Trump administration, all reinforced that decision. 
I think he liked the Gorsuch nomination. He liked the overall 
caliber, in his view, of this administration’s appellate nominees and 
saw someone who he thought was a strong nominee replacing Justice 
Scalia. So not someone that wouldn’t really affect the balance of the 
Court, nonetheless produce a virtually purely partisan vote, which 
would be, “I can’t wait for the midterms if I want to be replaced at 
all.” And so, I think there’s a logic there. And whether that was a 
good judgment or not is a separate matter, but this is prescriptive 
man. I think the logic is there. 
Professor Segall: And his son was Donald Trump’s banker. Go 
ahead. 
Professor Volokh: I assumed the subtext of your question was it 
may not be that surprising that he retires while a Republican is 
president, but here the Republican happens to be Trump and you 
would think he’s the sort of Republican that wouldn’t be wild about 
Trump. So, if I’m getting that subtext right, and look, I am really, 
really against Trump, and so I see where you’re coming from, it’s 
just that—although everything Trump touches turns to garbage—it 
turns out that Trump seems to care not at all about the judicial 
appointments. And so, the Supreme Court and most appellate court 
nominations seem to have just been run by the same sort of group of 
standard Federalist Society lawyers who would have been in control 
under a Rubio administration or a Cruz administration. 
If I were Kennedy and I’m seeing Trump and I’m kind of iffy 
about this, but then seeing—it was like Jonathan said—seeing a 
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bunch of the recent appointments would, I think, make me super 
confident. It would allay a lot of my concerns just seeing the kinds of 
people who were being nominated. 
Professor Segall: Lee, do you want to add anything? 
Professor Epstein: No. 
Professor Segall: Okay. I want to say, and it’s the last question of 
the day, Eugene. I want to say that there should be a surreal quality to 
the idea that we are the only democracy in the world that allows its 
high court Justices, the highest court Justices, to retire when they 
want, how they want, or never, which is the case with some Justices. 
And to the extent—I was surprised by these answers to your 
questions, great question. I was surprised by these answers because I 
think they’re probably right. And that means that he made a political 
calculation about when to retire. We shouldn’t put up with that as a 
country. Go ahead, Eugene. 
Professor Volokh: I’m shocked, shocked. 
Professor Eugene Volokh: As I understand it, Justice Kennedy was 
about in the majority in about 90%, is that right, on the five-four 
cases over this—let’s assume, let’s just assume. 
Professor Segall: Something like that. 
Professor Epstein: It’s close. 
Professor Segall: I think it’s five. 
Professor Epstein: No, no. Not five to four. 
Professor Eugene Volokh: Not five to four. Let’s say 70% of the 
five-four decisions, but most of those were conservative. So 
presumably, Justice Thomas was in the majority, not in 70% but not 
in 10%, maybe 55%. If Justice Thomas just decided, “You know, 
I’ve changed my way of thinking,” and he decided to vote the other 
way in Citizens United, in Heller, and all those cases, we would also 
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have had the opposite results. It’s just we would have had it in a 
smaller range of cases, but I think what was driving it is nobody 
expects it from Justice Thomas. So, he’s just predictable. It’s not that 
he lacks the power. It’s that we’re pretty confident how he’s going to 
use it. 
So as a result, that lacks drama. But if I’m right, then that may be 
the gulf. It may be that Justice Kennedy had power at the level of 
70% and Justice Thomas at the level of 55%, not a huge gulf. It’s just 
we weren’t quite sure in a lot of those cases where Justice Kennedy 
would go. Incidentally, you can imagine, and this may be a version of 
what Sasha was saying, you can imagine a situation where Justice 
Kennedy was also a swing voter but completely predictable just 
because we happened to know where he would go on everything just 
because he had spoken so clearly about it. 
Then again, he’d be a swing voter, he’d be more often the deciding 
factor than the others, but it still would be that the gulf would be at a 
seventy to fifty-five level. So, I’m wondering if we may be 
exaggerating as a result of that. 
Professor Volokh: Well, I think there are two separate issues. One 
of them is whether someone’s the median, and another is whether 
they’re unpredictable. So, for example, sometimes someone’s the 
median, but you’re not sure who it is. Sometimes you have a median 
voter, you know that they’re the median, but you know that they’re 
somewhere in the middle, but they could be here or here—or 
someone could be the median and you know exactly where they are. I 
think when we talk about how much power a person has, I always 
think of it in terms of perturbations of the world. Like you can 
imagine nearby universes where Kennedy is here or here, and those 
are close universes. So, in all those close universes, the change of 
Kennedy changes the rule, but in all of the close universes where 
Thomas changes, it doesn’t change the rule because that rule is 
determined by Kennedy. 
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Professor Eugene Volokh: Thomas voted the other way in Citizens 
United. 
Professor Adler: But Thomas would have to move—I think part of 
the idea is that in a lot of those cases, Thomas also has to move 
further. 
Professor Volokh: If you imagine ideal points, then moving the 
ideal point from here to here is a bigger perturbation of the world. 
Professor Segall: But there is one thing no one today has suggested, 
and Mike, forgive me in the back row when I suggest this. It is 
possible. These are human beings. This country has a tendency to not 
see Supreme Court Justices as—I’m lecturing now—as human 
beings. These are human beings. It is possible that one of the reasons 
Justice Kennedy was the swing Justice for seventeen years was 
because he wanted to be. In other words, it is absolute—Rick Garnett 
of Notre Dame, I think, believes this. If I’m wrong, I apologize to 
Rick, but part of what’s going on here is a non-legal, non-ideological, 
non-partisan personality trait that this person liked to have control. 
And if there is any truth in that or some truth—I’m sure there’s a 
little bit of truth in that. If there’s enough truth to matter in that 
description, it again goes to, I think—what I hope this whole day was 
about to some degree—was what kind of institution this Supreme 
Court is. I can’t believe Sasha demeaned, ten minutes ago, the idea 
that you asked that we should have deliberation and persuasion and 
try to—on these incredibly hard issues, the 40%, Jonathan, 30% of 
cases that are really hard, wouldn’t we want them to go into a room 
and fight it out, and they don’t do that. They do not do that. And 
maybe they didn’t do that because they knew it didn’t matter. Justice 
Kennedy was going to take it over anyway. Any of you guys want the 
last word on this? All right. Jonathan, go ahead. I’ll give it to you. 
Professor Adler: I would agree with you, they don’t do that enough, 
but we do know of cases in which Justices flip, cases in which Scalia 
lost a majority because he wouldn’t tone down his rhetoric, cases in 
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which it appears that whoever was assigned the majority opinion 
couldn’t write—it just wouldn’t write and wouldn’t work the way 
they thought it was going to—and that matters. It’s not as if they just 
kind of say, “Okay, my team is on this side, and we’re done.” They 
still have to be able to write the opinions and justify their opinions. 
And, yes, sometimes they do that more convincingly than others, but 
I think we’re not being fair to the way the institution operates if we 
assume that that’s all that’s occurring. There are too many data points 
that suggest people are movable, at least in some set of cases. 
Professor Segall: I think it would take a person of great character to 
refuse the temptation to have the career that Justice Kennedy had. 
Those people may exist, but it would take a person of great character. 
On that note, thank you everybody for coming. Thanks for this panel. 
I hope you have enjoyed today. 
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